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Fulfilling the Copyright Social Justice Promise: Digitizing Textual Information
I.	Introduction

The advent of commercially viable digitizing of text for mass distribution through
the Google Books Library Project (“Google Books Project”)1 and other text-digitizing
projects and developments like Europeana 2 and Amazon’s Kindle Reader, 3 places
new demands on intellectual property regimes, particularly with respect to author/
creator property right incentive mechanisms. While the full contours of the impact
of these developments cannot yet be fully appreciated, digitizing in other fields,
including music, video, and photography, has shown that there are many possible
effects arising from digitization, including the creation of new types of works as well
as the creation of new methods and channels for the distribution of creative works.
An additional impact, albeit sometimes overlooked and generally undervalued, is
that the new technologies provide new raw material and even new types of material
that can be used to create more new works, often more easily.4 Music and videos
made by sampling and remixing are these sorts of works.5 Indeed, there are even
significant sociological aspects to the digital revolution and the social networking
revolution that it has enabled that are only beginning to be understood.6 Along with
the social boons presented by the new technological applications for copyrighted
material, however, come the inevitable concerns regarding the attendant creation of
new modes of infringement.
While such concerns can be legitimate, the impact of digitizing textual works on
copyright law must be evaluated from the broader perspective of copyright law’s
1.

The Google Books Project is intended to make it easier for people to find and have access to books,
including books that are out of print, by creating digital copies of the world’s printed texts. To this end,
Google has partnered with libraries through its Library Project and with publishers through its Partner
Program. “[The Project’s] ultimate goal is to create a comprehensive, searchable, virtual card catalog of
all books in all languages.” Google Books Library Project, Google Books, http://books.google.com/
googlebooks/library.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2010). See also Google Books Settlement Agreement, Google
Books, http://books.google.com/googlebooks/agreement/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2010).

2.

Europena is a project of the European Commission to make “European information resources easier to
use in an online environment. It will build on Europe’s rich heritage, combining multicultural and
multilinguial environments with technological advances and new business models.” About us,
Europeana, http://www.europeana.eu/portal/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2010).

3.

Kindle Wireless Reading Device, Amazon, http://www.amazon.com/dp/B0015T963C (last visited Oct.
15, 2010).

4.

See generally Lawrence Lessig, Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid
Economy 255 (2008); Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright 15–16 (2006); William Patry, Moral
Panics and Copyright Wars 7, 36 (2009). Of course, these changes concern the traditional publishing
houses. Randall Stross, Will Books Be Napsterized? N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 2001, http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/10/04/business/04digi.html?_r=1.

5.

Copyright Criminals (Copyright Criminals, LLC 2009). “Long before people began posting their
homemade video mashups on the Web, hip-hop musicians were perfecting the art of audio montage through
sampling. Sampling—or riffing—is as old as music itself, but new technologies developed in the 1980s and
1990s made it easier to reuse existing sound recordings.” Copyright Criminals, The Film, PBS, available at
http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/copyright-criminals/film.html (last visited Oct 28, 2010).

6.

See Michael Wesch, An Anthropological Introduction to YouTube, YouTube (July 26, 2008), http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=TPAO-lZ4_hU.
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social utility and social justice function, and not merely from a myopic view of the
copyright law’s property rights incentives.7 The constitutional mandate that copyright
law serve societal progress8 requires more than maximizing protection of the
commoditization interests of those responsible for the generation of new works.
There are other obligations of social utility and social justice that must also be
satisfied, including the broad dissemination of copyrighted works and the opportunity
for others to build from those earlier works. This is not merely theory. The creation
of broader access to information by many people with various backgrounds and
perspectives can be critical to effective problem solving9 and, indeed, helps to produce
more and better information, knowledge, and aesthetic expression than limiting
access to information to individuals working alone.10 Consequently, as more material
becomes available through the Google Books Project and other initiatives for massdigitization of text, care must be taken to optimize the law to promote cultural
progress as a whole, and not simply to protect the prosaic, secular aspects of the
authors’ incentive mechanism.
Let us hasten to add that we are not copyright iconoclasts; in our judgment,
protecting authors’ interests is important because doing so provides a valuable and
proper motivation for the creation and dissemination of new works and, indeed, can
provide important opportunities for inclusion and empowerment of marginalized
groups within our society. We thus believe that the protection afforded to the
copyright property interests of authors should be vital and strong. However, we also
believe that balance is required and that the grant of a copyright should be only as
strong as needed to incentivize authors to create and disseminate works.
At present, the balance of interests between author and user often seems skewed
in favor of the former, and far beyond what is needed to incentivize the creation of
works. Copyright should be an engine of progress in the creation and dissemination
of information, not a brake on it. Moreover, copyright should not be manipulated to
maintain particular business models, but rather should focus on furthering dynamism
in society, including its economic aspects. Accordingly, new technological applications
for copyrighted works should be incorporated into the copyright regime with these
principles in mind.
This article explores the evolving copyright landscape in the Digital Information
Age and places the Google Books Project and the Google Books Settlement
Agreement (the “Settlement”)11 within that terrain. We attempt to demonstrate how
this initiative—the mass-digitization of the nation’s storehouse of printed texts with
the goal of making them available to anyone who has access to the Internet—fits
squarely within that terrain. Briefly, we contend it does so because it serves copyright
7.

See generally Patry, supra note 4.

8.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

9.

See generally Scott E. Page, The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better
Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies (2007).

10.

See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge (2006).

11.

See generally Google Books Settlement Agreement, supra note 1.
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law’s central purpose of advancing knowledge and culture by furthering copyright’s
social utility and social justice goals through inclusion of those who have been
excluded. The Google Books Project furthers these goals by using an accepted
copyright mechanism (i.e., a private, court-supervised settlement) to address the
novel copyright problems presented by the new technologies, while still preserving
the rights of copyright holders. In sum, the incorporation of this new technology and
the works generated through it into the copyright regime achieves the social utility
balance mandated by the U.S. Constitution and helps fulfill the social justice promise
of copyright law.
II. COPYRIGHT PURPOSE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

Serving social justice is an integral aspect of U.S. copyright law and has been
from the beginning. In drafting the Copyright Clause, our Constitution’s framers
penned a broad directive of social utility: “Congress shall have the power . . . to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their Writings . . . .”12 Thus the Constitution
empowers Congress to adopt and revise laws providing for copyright protection13 as
a social engineering mechanism14 for advancing and shaping American culture.
American copyright law affords specific, exclusive property rights to authors through
the Copyright Act as a means by which to spur artistic endeavors.15 At the same time,
however, corollary rights and privileges for making use of copyrighted material are
granted to the public, including users of all types, from passive observers or listeners to
12.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

13.

See generally Stacy F. McDonald, Comment, Copyright for Sale: How the Commodification of Intellectual
Property Distorts the Social Bargain Implicit in the Copyright Clause, 50 How. L.J. 541, 542–43 (2007)
(providing background information about laws adopted by Congress under the U.S. Constitution’s
Copyright Clause); Edward T. Saadi, Sound Recordings Need Sound Protection, 5 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J.
333, 335–36 (1997) (providing background information about laws adopted by Congress under the U.S.
Constitution’s Copyright Clause).

14.

See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“The economic
philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”) (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 209 (1954)); Paul Goldstein, Goldstein on Copyright § 1.14 (3d ed. Supp. 2010); Justin
Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. L.J. 287, 299, 291 (1988) (discussing economic
theories underlying copyright law); Scott L. Bach, Note, Music Recording, Publishing, and Compulsory
Licenses: Toward a Consistent Copyright Law, 14 Hofstra L. Rev. 379, 383 (1986); Jason S. Rooks,
Note, Constitutionality of Judicially-Imposed Compulsory Licenses in Copyright Infringement Cases, 3 J.
Intell. Prop. L.J. 255, 257 (1995); cf. 2 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on
Copyright, § 8.01[A] (2010).

15.

See 17 U.S.C. (2006 & Supp. 2010); e.g. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. 471 U.S. at 546–47; Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); see also, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 14;
cf. Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 14, § 14.03 (discussing the copyright owner’s remedies with respect
to the infringer’s profits); Lateef Mtima, Tasini and Its Progeny: The New Exclusive Right or Fair Use on
the Electronic Publishing Frontier?, 14 Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Ent. L.J. 369, 396–97 (2004);
Michael G. Anderson & Paul F. Brown, The Economics Behind Copyright Fair Use: A Principled and
Predictable Body of Law, 24 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 143, 158–59 (1993).
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active creators using ideas and elements from prior works.16 Together, the recognized
rights and interests of authors and of the public are intended to form a synergistic
framework to effectuate the social utility objectives of the Copyright Clause.17
Indeed, the first American copyright law, enacted by the First Congress as the
1790 Copyright Act, was entitled “An Act for the Encouragement of Learning.”18
Until the 1976 Copyright Act became effective in 1978, publication of the work was
required as a condition of obtaining federal copyright under the 1909 Act.19 The
1976 Copyright Act changed the basis of copyright from publication to fixation.20
However, the 1976 Copyright Act still required compliance with the formalities of
notice, registration, and deposit. 21 The deposit of copies of the works with the
Library of Congress helped build the vast storehouse of information the Library of
Congress has become. Thus, the socio-utilitarian purpose of copyright law has been
at its core since the beginning, though this purpose has at times been eroded by
certain changes in the law.22
In keeping with the constitutional mandate, both Congress and the courts have
determined that, unlike natural law intellectual property regimes, the primary
objective underlying American copyright law is to engender the broadest possible
production and dissemination of creative works for society’s benefit. Widespread
16.

E.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A claim of copyright infringement
is subject to certain statutory exceptions, including the fair use exception.”); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v.
Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[The fair use doctrine] permits courts
to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity
which that law is designed to foster.”). See generally I. Fred Koenigsberg, Lines of Defense: An Analytic
Framework for the Defense of Copyright Infringement, 1 Landslide 36, 39–40 (2009) (discussing potential
defenses to claims of copyright infringement).

17.

We have each separately addressed aspects of this idea from different perspectives in prior works,
e.g., Lateef Mtima, Copyright Social Utility and Social Justice Interdependence: A Paradigm for Intellectual
Property Empowerment and Digital Entrepreneurship, 112 W. Va. L. Rev. 97 (2009); Steven D. Jamar,
Copyright and the Public Interest from the Perspective of Brown v. Board of Education, 48 How. L.J. 629,
639 (2005).

18.

Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 2 Stat. 124 (1790) (current version at 17 U.S.C. (2006 & Supp.
2010)).

19.

Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 329, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. (2006 & Supp.
2010)).

20. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (1976) (current version at 17 U.S.C. (2006 & Supp.

2010)).

21.

Id. Prior to the establishment of the Library of Congress in 1800, deposits were made to the Secretary
of State. These formalities (notice, registration, and deposit) were dropped when the 1976 Act was
amended in 1988 in order to bring the United States into compliance with international standards,
especially with the Berne Convention. The Berne Convention is the principal multilateral treaty
governing the protection of copyrights in the international arena; by bringing U.S. copyright law into
compliance with Berne, the United States gained protection for its copyrighted works in all of the other
countries that are also signatories to the Convention. See Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works art. 5, § 2, Sept. 28, 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27.

22.

See L. Ray Patterson & Stanley F. Birch, Jr., A Unified Theory of Copyright (Craig Joyce ed.,
2009), printed in 46 Hous. L. Rev. 215 (2009); Patry, supra note 4.
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production and dissemination of creative works benefits the recipients directly by
their use of and exposure to the works, and benefits society indirectly by the recipients
in turn building upon those ideas. Thus the production of additional works by the
first order recipients benefits not only those recipients, but also the next order of
recipients who continue the cycle, igniting and perpetuating a chain reaction of
cultural advancement and ultimately advancing society as a whole.
In short, the aim of the copyright law is progress; the means is the granting of
limited copyright property rights. As the Supreme Court stated in Feist, “[t]he
primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’” 23 The Court continued, “[t]o this end,
copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others
to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed in the work.”24
Furthermore, as the Court explained in Eldred, “copyright’s limited monopolies
are compatible with free speech principles,” 25 “[i]ndeed, copyright’s purpose is to
promote the creation and publication of free expression.”26 The ends sought are the
protection of the public interest, progress, and the public good. The means of doing
so is the granting of a limited property right, a so-called limited monopoly to
encourage the creation of works. Copyright is therefore not about profit for the
person—it is about “profit” for society.
However, some legal scholars and commentators have questioned whether
copyright law can truly be said to fulfill its function of social utility if, in advancing
the societal culture, it fails to achieve an adequate measure of social justice as well.27
Does a civilization or culture genuinely advance when significant segments of its
populace remain bereft of the benefits of societal progress and achievements? As
23.

Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.
8); accord Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 187, 212 (2003); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,
422 U.S. 151, 154 (1975); Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966).

24.

Feist, 499 U.S. at 349–50 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556–
57 (1985)); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (stating
that the purpose of copyright is to promote wide dissemination of information, literature, music, and
other arts); Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 156. See generally Patterson & Birch, supra
note 22, at 256–58, 284–86; Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994) (“We have often
recognized the monopoly privileges that Congress has authorized . . . are limited in nature and must
ultimately serve the public good.”).

25.

Eldred, 537 U.S. at 190.

26. Id. at 219.
27.

See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Distributive and Syncretic Motives in Intellectual Property Law (with Special Reference
to Coercion, Agency, and Development), 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 717, 721 (2007); Anupam Chander &
Madhavi Sunder, Is Nozick Kicking Rawls’s Ass? Intellectual Property and Social Justice, 40 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 563, 564–65 (2007); Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 Cardozo
L. Rev. 2821, 2912 (2006); Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. Davis
L. Rev. 1151, 1204–05 (2007); K.J. Greene, “Copynorms,” Black Cultural Production, and the Debate Over
African-American Reparations, 25 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 1179, 1227 (2008); Mtima, supra note 17,
at 151; Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers, and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine For Cyberspace, 53 Fla.
L. Rev. 107, 153–54 (2001); Hannibal Travis, Building Universal Digital Libraries: An Agenda for
Copyright Reform, 33 Pepp. L. Rev. 761, 832 (2006); McDonald, supra note 13, at 543–44.
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philosophers and statesmen have urged, we should measure a society by its treatment
of those on the lowest rungs of the ladder.28
Social justice is part of the progress that copyright law intends to advance. Social
justice is a protean concept that varies with circumstances. It includes the aspirational
ideal of substantive equality as well as the relatively easily addressable procedural
equality. 29 Social justice includes at least some aspects of individual liberty (e.g.,
autonomy) as well as incorporating some communitarian liberty values such as
religious association, pursuit of legitimate group interests, and civic virtues such as
voting. Social justice includes not only access to, but also inclusion in, the social,
cultural, and economic life of the country. Indeed, it extends beyond inclusion in
social, cultural, and economic life to full participation in and ability to affect the
direction of civil society in all its manifestations. Social justice thus rests upon the
core values of equality, liberty, and advancing the general welfare enshrined in the
Declaration of Independence30 and Preamble to the U.S. Constitution.31
These very same principles are echoed in the grant of power to Congress over
copyrights and patents: the power is granted for the progress of all, not for the benefit
of a few.32 When Congress exercises its grant of power, the resulting law becomes the
supreme law of the land to ensure that the benefits are distributed widely and fairly,
and not burdened by or hoarded by each state. 33
In the field of intellectual property, social justice includes the ability to enjoy the
fruits of others at some base level of procedural equality (equal access to the works of
others) and, to a lesser but important extent, the ability to have some base level of
substantive equality in the beneficial impact of intellectual property created by others.
Even more importantly, social justice in the area of intellectual property extends
28. James Boswell, The Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. 130 (1791) (quoting Samuel Johnson as saying,

“[a] decent provision for the poor is the true test of civilization”); John Emerich Edward DalbergActon, The History of Freedom and Other Essays 4 (John Neville Figgis & Reginald Vere
Laurence eds., Dodo Press 2008) (1907) (“The most certain test by which we judge whether a country
is really free is the amount of security enjoyed by minorities.”); Daniel B. Baker, Political
Quotations 213 (Daniel B. Baker ed., Gale Research Inc., 1990) (quoting Senator Hubert H.
Humphrey, addressing the 1976 Democratic National Convention) (“[T]he moral test of government is
how that government treats those who are in the dawn of life, the children; those who are in the twilight
of life, the elderly; those who are in the shadows of life; the sick, the needy and the handicapped.”).

29. See, e.g., Carla D. Pratt, Way To Represent: The Role of Black Lawyers in Contemporary American Democracy,

77 Fordham L. Rev. 1409 (2009).

30. See Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that

all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unanlienable Rights, that
among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness.”).

31.

See U.S. Const. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare,
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America.”) (emphasis added).

32.

See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries . . . .”) (emphasis added).

33.

U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
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beyond mere access and beyond mere passive observation or enjoyment of others’
works (e.g., listening to a recording or seeing a movie): it includes the ability to
participate in the creation and exploitation of intellectual property both in a
procedurally fair way and a substantively significant way. 34 Viewed from this
perspective, the copyright law (and the Constitution as a whole) directs policymakers
to act affirmatively to advance the cause of social justice through copyright.35
This obligation to consider social justice implications of copyright law extends to the
digital environment. Indeed, the advent of the Digital Information Age is in part
responsible for refocusing scholarly, political, and professional attention toward the social
utility and social justice obligations of the copyright law.36 A brief diversion to discuss
some attributes of the Digital Information Age will make clear the importance of
considering social justice and social utility in fashioning and applying copyright law.
Digital information technology has provided unexpected and unforeseen
opportunities for the development, dissemination, and exploitation of individual
creative expression. Technological advances provide unprecedented access to
copyrighted material through the Internet and a variety of digital media formats. In
addition, these advances have enabled end users of copyrighted materials to engage
in new forms of creative expression, not only with respect to their own original
expression, but through the reuse or “remix” of pre-existing (and previously static)
copyrighted material.37 In the context of global culture, digital information technology
presents attractive possibilities for heretofore marginalized groups and cultures to
share their indigenous creative expression, not only to help educate outsiders about
their aesthetic customs and cultural beliefs, but also to help them gain economic
independence and socio-political empowerment.38
Concomitant with this plethora of artistic and educational boons, digital
information technology also exposes weaknesses in the social utility/social justice
effects of copyright law. Perhaps foremost among the deleterious effects is the Digital
Divide: while many Americans now enjoy greater access to the national (and multinational) store of copyrighted works, other citizens remain isolated from such benefits
through their lack of access to information technology and/or the skills to utilize
34. See generally Page, supra note 9; Sunstein, supra note 10.
35.

See Chander & Sunder, supra note 27, at 578 (“No human domain should be immune from the claims of
social justice. Intellectual property, like property law, structures social relations and has profound social
effects.”); Charles H. Norchi, The Legal Architecture of Nation Building, 60 Me. L. Rev. 281, 290 (2008)
(“Ensuring the human dignity of the beneficiary population is one of the foundational justifications for
nation-building products. As a practical matter, this is also a precondition for progress on any other
reconstruction front.”).

36. See Travis, supra note 27, at 763–64; Chander & Sunder, supra note 27, at 565; Chon, supra note 27, at

2831–32; Okediji, supra note 27, at 126–28; David Cook, Comment, Searching for Answers in a Digital
World: How Field v. Google Could Affect Fair Use Analysis in the Internet Age, 11 SMU Sci. & Tech. L.
Rev. 77, 83–84 (2007). At least equally responsible is the rise of voices raising perspectives that grow
out of the civil rights movement. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 27, at 1194–99; Lateef Mtima, Intellectual
Property and Social Justice, 48 How. L.J. 571, 572–77 (2005); Jamar, supra note 17, at 639.

37.

Lessig, supra note 4, at 255–56.

38. Copyright Criminals, supra note 5.
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such technology effectively. Indeed, in some cases, access to copyrighted works for
some has actually diminished as digital formats have become the dominant medium
for creative expression. 39 And while digital information technology proffers new
avenues for the socially beneficial exploration and use of marginalized indigenous
cultural expression, it also presents new methods for cultural pillaging and other
unwelcome and inequitable intrusions upon sacred and otherwise revered cultural
practices and belief systems.40
The proliferation of digital information technology (as well as the resultant
Digital Divide) has often spawned polarized and polarizing rhetoric by and on behalf
of authors and users. The tension between authors and users is often portrayed in
absolute and vitriolic terms, indeed, even as a war between the proponents of the
copyright social benefits that digital information technology can bestow upon society
as a whole,41 and those who favor the commoditization interests of individual
copyright owners, particularly the commercial copyright industries.42
39.

See, e.g., Janet Thompson Jackson, Capitalizing on Digital Entrepreneurship for Low-Income Residents and
Communities, 112 W. Va. L. Rev. 187, 189–92 (2009).

40. See Thekla Hansen-Young, Whose Name Is It Anyway? Protecting Tribal Names From Cybersquatters, 10

Va. J.L. & Tech. 6 (2005) (examining the remedies available to tribes seeking to protect their tribal
name from cybersquatting); Danielle Conway-Jones, Safeguarding Hawaiian Traditional Knowledge and
Cultural Heritage: Supporting the Right to Self-Determination and Preventing the Co-modification of Culture,
48 How. L.J. 737 (2005) (supporting the proposition that Western intellectual property law and its
protections should not extend to native Hawaiian cultures and traditions for the purpose of preservation);
R. Hokulei Lindsey, Responsibility and Accountability: The Birth of a Strategy to Protect Kanaka Maoli
Traditional Knowledge, 48 How. L.J. 763 (2005) (discussing how intellectual property has not aided in
protecting Kanaka Maoli traditional knowledge, but is actually facilitating in the misappropriation of
the traditional indigenous knowledge and further discussing how that knowledge can be protected).

41.

This point is made with particular force by William Patry, who describes both the phenomena and the
deleterious impacts of using such strident metaphors in the dispute. Patry, supra note 4. One attribute
of the posturing is the use of unsupportable claims of losses due to copying without permission for
copyrighted materials, id. at 30–36, and unsupportable claims of losses due to counterfeit products being
sold. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-10-423, Report to Congressional Committees,
Observations on Efforts to Quantify the Economic Effects of Counterfeit and Pirated
Goods 27 (2010). The major conclusion of the GAO is:

Id.
42.

While experts and literature we reviewed provided different examples of effects on the
U.S. economy, most observed that despite significant efforts, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to quantify the net effect of counterfeiting and piracy on the economy as a
whole. For example, as previously discussed, OECD attempted to develop an estimate of
the economic impact of counterfeiting and concluded that an acceptable overall estimate
of counterfeit goods could not be developed. OECD further stated that information that
can be obtained, such as data on enforcement and information developed through surveys,
“has significant limitations, however, and falls far short of what is needed to develop a
robust overall estimate.” One expert characterized the attempt to quantify the overall
economic impact of counterfeiting as “fruitless,” while another stated that any estimate is
highly suspect since this is covert trade and the numbers are all “guesstimates.”

See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Commercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17
Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1, 77–78 (2004); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of
“Authorship,” 1991 Duke L.J. 455, 462.
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Both the erstwhile war and vitriol are misguided, as becomes clear upon
remembering the overarching social utility goals of the copyright law, including the
social justice aspects of inclusion and the empowerment of disadvantaged groups.
The rhetoric of absolutist entrenchment of rights is misguided, both substantively
and practically. Accommodating the competing interests in exploiting and using
copyrighted works can best be accomplished by revisiting the social utility purpose of
the copyright law including the social justice effects. Indeed, even broader questions
regarding digital and other dissemination and exploitation of creative cultural
expression outside the protection of the copyright regime can be addressed through
empathic invocation of the social utility goals of the copyright law. That is, the social
justice focus can help improve not only copyright law, but also can help address
related development and information dissemination issues.
Consistent with the constitutional mandate of the Copyright Clause and the
specific social utility and social justice objectives of the copyright law, the Digital
Divide and related copyright social inequities should be addressed as something
other than an issue of the allocation of limited resources. These intertwined problems
can be seen instead as matters of constitutional stature that warrant affirmative steps
to address the concerns. The constitutional principles of justice, progress, equality,
and liberty are directly applicable when they arise in the intellectual property context:
everyone is to be included; none should be excluded; the common welfare and
progress are the foci; and, although the individual should be able to benefit from his
or her own creation, societal advancement is the paramount goal.
Developing an appropriate social justice/authors’ rights equipoise that conforms
to the fundamental aim of copyright law in the Digital Information Age requires a
conf luence of various copyright constituencies’ interests, ideas, and initiatives.
Congress, the courts, copyright owners, and the public each have a critical role to
play in shaping the contours of copyright in response to the new challenges—and
new opportunities—afforded by advances in technology for the generation of, access
to, and use of creative expression.
III.	COPYRIGHT DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLES OF CONGRESS, THE COURTS,
AND PRIVATE PARTIES IN FURTHERING THE CONSTITUTIONAL PURPOSE

Congress, the courts, and private parties each play an important role in assuring
that the law’s overarching objectives of societal progress are achieved. For example,
in enacting the Copyright Act, Congress included provisions that promote progress
of society in manifold ways, including the grant to authors of a limited monopoly to
incentivize the creation and dissemination of works, the grant to users of the fair use
right to enable the use of protected elements of works in socially beneficent ways, the
grant of compulsory licenses in various circumstances to promote commercial
exploitation of works (e.g, by recording a cover of a song), as well as many more.43
43.

See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 107, 115 (2006 & Supp. 2010). See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 108–122 (2006 &
Supp. 2010).
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The courts also play a vital role in furthering the constitutional purpose of the
Copyright Clause by interpreting and applying the Copyright Act appropriately,
keeping it within constitutional bounds. For example, courts created the fair use
doctrine and have safeguarded it to protect things like parodic uses of copyrighted
works.44 At the same time, when the courts get the balance wrong, Congress has
stepped in to correct it. For example, when the courts did not allow software users to
make random access memory copies in connection with the maintenance and repair
of their computer systems, Congress amended the Copyright Act to expressly allow
users to do so.45
Private parties can also substantially affect the social utility and social justice
aspects of copyright by making works available that might otherwise not be readily
available to some populations. Private parties can also cooperate to employ the law
creatively to advance the public’s interest by creating mechanisms to manage
distribution of some types of works in ways that both compensate copyright holders
and disseminate the works more broadly.46
Throughout the history of American copyright law, Congress, the courts, and
private parties have embraced opportunities to advance the law, sometimes proceeding
individually but often acting in concert. Reviewing some of the salient efforts by
each of these actors to address new challenges to the copyright regime can provide
insight into similar opportunities in the Digital Information Age.
A. The Role of Congress

Congress and the courts set the general rules concerning the scope of copyright
protections in a variety of ways. As the Supreme Court properly notes, “it is generally
for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause’s
objectives,”47 and “the Copyright Clause empowers Congress to determine the
intellectual property regimes that, overall, in that body’s judgment, will serve the
ends of the Clause.”48
In furthering the goal of cultural progress through the dissemination of
knowledge, Congress has limited its grant of the copyright exploitation monopoly in
a number of important ways. It has enacted limits on protectable subject matter (e.g.,
under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) facts are not copyrightable, which is essentially a codification
44. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569, 574–77 (1994).
45.

See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 301, 112 Stat. 2860, 2886 (1998).

46. See, e.g., private collective rights organizations such as The American Society of Composers, Authors

and Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), and the Harry Fox Agency (HFA), which
facilitate exploitation of musical compositions and sound recordings in economically efficient ways that
also serve the public purpose of copyright by effectuating broad dissemination of works. About ASCAP,
ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/about/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2010); About BMI, BMI, http://www.bmi.
com/about/?link=navbar (last visited Oct. 25, 2010); What does HFA do?, HFA, http://www.harryfox.
com/public/WhatdoesHFAdo.jsp (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).

47.

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003).

48. Id. at 222.
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of the constitutional requirements of originality and authorship) and has enacted
various exceptions and limitations to the copyright monopoly, including codifying
the judicially created doctrine of the right of fair use.49 Congress has also enacted
numerous other specific limitations for particular types of works (e.g., § 113 limiting
rights in pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, and § 117 limiting rights in
software); for particular types of uses (e.g., § 109, the “first sale doctrine,” limiting
the right of distribution, and §§ 114 and 119 limiting rights in secondary
transmissions); and for particular types of users (e.g., § 108 for libraries and § 121 for
reproduction for use by the blind).50
As new challenges and opportunities arise, it is the responsibility of Congress to
respond with appropriate legislation to assure the continued achievement of the
constitutional copyright mandates of copyright social utility and social justice.
Congress has a wide range of options it can pursue in maintaining the balance. For
example, Congress can limit the scope of an author’s rights, such as it did when
extending copyright to architectural works.51
Congress can also choose to maintain the authors’ exclusive rights to specific
uses of their works, but mandate terms upon which the works must nonetheless be
licensed to the public through a copyright compulsory license. In the right
circumstances a compulsory license both reaffirms author incentives and also helps
achieve widespread public engagement in a particular use of copyrighted material. In
adopting a copyright compulsory license, Congress is making the determination that,
insofar as a particular use for copyrighted material is concerned, the traditional
“author-versus-public” allocation is inadequate to effectuate the overarching copyright
social utility goals.
Congress most typically resorts to the compulsory license mechanism in response
to the introduction of a new technological use for copyrighted material. New
technological uses often present socially complex opportunities for promoting literary
and artistic advance. The new technology may replicate an existing exclusive right,
but it might also present new social utility considerations such that automatic
relegation of the new technological use to authors would be inconsistent with the
underlying purpose of copyright protection. Consequently, in order to preserve the
copyright social utility balance, Congress instead engages in an ad hoc apportionment
of the use between authors and the public. In this way, the author retains the right to
receive compensation in connection with the use. Yet, in setting the amount of that
compensation, Congress effectively places control over the right to engage in the use
in the hands of the copyright-using public.

49. William F. Patry, Patry on Fair Use, §§ 1:2–1:3 (Thomson/West 2009); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas.

342, 344–45, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (stating that “fair and bona fide abridgment of an original work,
is not a piracy of the copyright of the author”).

50. 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 109, 113, 114, 117, 119, 121 (2006 & Supp. 2010).
51.

See 17 U.S.C. § 120 (2006 & Supp. 2010); Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, tit. VII, §
703, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
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B. The Role of the Courts

Whereas Congress has the responsibility for enacting and amending appropriate
copyright law, it is the role of the courts to assure its proper interpretation and
application. For more than two hundred years, the courts have developed a body of
copyright jurisprudence that, with mixed success, seeks to ensure that the copyright
law remains faithful to its constitutional underpinnings.52 For example, the Supreme
Court has explicitly stated that originality is a constitutional requirement of copyright
protection and has set the threshold for what level of originality is required: “Even a
slight amount will suffice,” provided the works possess some “creative spark ‘no
matter how crude, humble or obvious’ it might be.”53
In addition to preserving the constitutional constraints on Congress, the courts
also play a variety of affirmative roles in fashioning, administering, and adapting the
copyright regime. Through judicial interpretation and application of copyright law to
specific disputes and controversies, the courts clarify the legal rights and interests
created under the Copyright Act and help adapt the law to contemporary challenges.54
And, of course, courts resolve individual copyright disputes.
But the role of the courts is more than this. The courts have an independent
responsibility that is complementary to the powers and obligations of Congress to
ensure that the copyright law serves to promote the development, use, and exploitation
of artistic expression, and to thereby satisfy the copyright social engineering directive
set forth in the Constitution.55 To this end, courts have developed a variety of
doctrines, some prudential and some constitutionally required, that limit the reach of
a copyright owner’s monopoly.
52.

Compare Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (eliminating the “sweat of
the brow” theory), and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574–77 (1994) (recognizing
parody as fair use), with Eldred, 537 U.S. at 186 (allowing expansion of the “limited time” of copyright
unquestionably to a point far greater than needed to insure the creation and dissemination of new
works).

53.

Feist, 499 U.S. at 369. One right that has not been considered as a limit on copyright is the right to equal
protection under the law. Although it would be merely an academic exercise at this point, one can craft
a good argument that the values of equality, and of inclusion to achieve equality, can inform interpretation
of the Copyright Act and could, in some circumstance, act as limits on ever-expansive readings of the
rights granted to authors. This equality right and the equality principle both fit tightly with the social
justice impetus of the copyright constitutional provision of promoting progress: Society includes (or
should include) everyone.

54. See Dennis S. Karajala, Harry Potter, Tanya Grotter, and the Copyright Derivative Work, 38 Ariz. St. L.J.

17, 34–35 (2006); Lydia Pallas Loren, Digitization, Commodification, Criminalization: The Evolution of
Criminal Copyright Infringement and The Importance of the Willfulness Requirement, 77 Wash. U.L.Q.
835, 888–89 (1999); Michael Spink, Authors Stripped of Their Electronic Rights in Tasini v. New York
Times Co., 32 J. Marshall L. Rev. 409, 420 (1999); Sarah Deutsch, Fair Use in Copyright Law and the
Nonprofit Organization: A Proposal for Reform, 34 Am. U.L. Rev. 1327, 1351 n.170 (1985).

55.

See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright at the Supreme Court: A Jurisprudence of Deference, 47 J. Copyright
Soc’y U.S.A. 317, 319 (2000) (“Elements of the [Supreme C]ourt’s . . . interpretation of the Copyright
Clause . . . include an emphasis on the public good that forces [authors’ rights] to be conditioned by the
public . . . . From the first case, through the present, the Court has treated copyright law as positive law,
the parameters of which are determined by Congress ([as] limited by the Constitution’s strictures).”).
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Many examples exist of the active and important role of the courts in furthering
the constitutional mandate of serving the greater public good through the broadest
dissemination and use of creative works, and in a manner consistent with the
incentivizing copyright monopoly over certain rights in the work.56 The most
prominent example of the courts fulfilling this role is the judicial creation,
development, and application of the doctrine of fair use.57 Fair use ensures that the
incentive mechanism of granting an author a property interest does not subordinate
important social utility needs of society as a whole.58
For 188 years, from the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1790 until the 1976
Copyright Act went into effect in 1978, Congress did not provide explicit statutory
protection for fair use.59 In 1841, in deciding whether a user infringed another’s
copyright, Judge Story wrote:
In short, we must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the nature
and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials
used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the
profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.60

Over the ensuing years, the courts recognized an inherent public privilege to make
fair use of copyrighted works, and thus to intrude upon a copyright owner’s exclusive
exploitive rights for the purpose of educational and literary discourse and
comment.61
Fair use developed into an “equitable doctrine [which] permits other people to
use copyrighted material without the owner’s consent in a reasonable manner for
certain purposes.”62 It enables the copyright law to account for certain situations,
56. See, e.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 349 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists

Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 398–400 (1968); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 549 (1985); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).

57.

See Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 342, 344–45, 348; Sharon Appel, Copyright, Digitization of Images, and Art
Museums: Cyberspace and Other New Frontiers, 6 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 150, 167 (1999).

58. See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1107 (1990).
59.

See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006 & Supp. 2010) (codifying fair use).

60. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344–45, 348; see also Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869)

(quoting Folsom).

61.

See William F. Patry, The Fair Use Privilege in Copyright Law 52–55 (2d ed. 1995); Folsom, 9 F.
Cas. at 349; Leval, supra note 58, at 1105 (“Not long after the creation of the copyright law by the
Statute of Anne of 1709, courts recognized that certain instances of unauthorized reproduction of
copyrighted material, first described as ‘fair abridgment,’ later ‘fair use,’ would not infringe the author’s
rights.”).

62. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (1992); see Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1117 (D. Nev.

2006); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575–77 (1994); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448–51 (1984); Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510,
1521–22 (9th Cir. 1992); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Miff lin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1264 (11th Cir.
2001); see also Patry, supra note 49, at 3–5; I. Fred Koenigsberg, Copyrights, in Understanding Basic
Copyright Law 2002 147–48 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Practice,
Course Handbook Ser. No. G-710, 2002); Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 14, at § 13.05; Leval, supra
note 58, at 1127–28.
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among others, in which a specific unauthorized use of copyrighted material will have
little to no impact upon the author’s overall incentive and compensation interests,
and the social utilities to be achieved in permitting the use warrants a limited
intrusion upon the copyright holder’s exclusive rights.63
Somewhat more difficult in terms of getting the balance right are uses that can
have a more significant impact on a copyright holder’s interests, such as in the
creation of works based on, or incorporating parts of, the underlying work. Parodies
are of this type,64 as are some forms of commentary, which may in fact adversely and
even significantly affect the copyright holder’s compensation; a devastating review of
a play, for example, can have this effect.65
Today, the judicially created fair use doctrine remains the predominant juridical
tool for limiting an author’s property rights in deference to the social utility demands
of the copyright law. As Professor Goldstein puts it:
The social judgment in these cases is that, even if transaction costs do not
systematically disable negotiated licenses, these users are not only so important
but also so characteristically underfunded that they deserve a free ride or, at
least, should be required to compensate the copyright holder with no more
than a reasonable fee. These social judgments presuppose that the copyright
owner will be able to earn returns in other markets that are sufficient to
provide it with the incentives it needs to produce copyrighted works in the
desired quantity and of the desired quality. 66

Even after Congress codified fair use in 1976 in § 107, the equitable nature of the
doctrine means that the most important developments in the doctrine of fair use are still
found in the courts which are constrained only loosely by the language of the statute.67

63. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 14, § 10.2.1, at 10:19–10:22; Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 14, §

13.05[A][1]; Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable Works in Digital
Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob and Sega, 1 J. Intell. Prop. L. 49, 56–57 (1994); Sharon Appel,
supra note 57, at 174–75.

64. See Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 574–77 (“Oh! Pretty Woman” parody by 2 Live Crew allowed as fair use

without permission of copyright holder).

65.

Broadway Shows Big Flops: Some Broadway Shows Close Early, Close on Opening Night, or Don’t Even Make
It To Opening Night, New York Show Tickets, www.nytix.com/Links/Broadway/Articles/
broadwayflops.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2010) (“Recent Broadway flop shows that closed on opening
night include Moose Murders in 1983, The Oldest Living Confederate Widow Tells All in 2003, and
Glory Days in ‘08.”).

66. Goldstein, supra note 14, § 7.0.2, at 7:7; see also, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 63, at 51; Leval, supra note

58; Madison River Mgmt. Co. v. Bus. Mgmt. Software Corp., 387 F. Supp. 2d 521, 535–37 (2005); Sega
v. Accolade, 977 F. 2d at 1520–27.

67.

While 17 U.S.C. § 107 sets forth four factors that courts must consider in deciding whether an
unauthorized use of a copyrighted work should be permitted as a fair use, the courts are free to consider
other factors as well. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)
(finding that use of a critical section of Gerald Ford’s memoirs printed prior to book publication or
licensed magazine syndication was not a fair use); Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579 (finding that creation of a
derivative work parodying original work was permissible as a fair use).
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Ultimately, fair use determinations are extremely fact sensitive, and decisions somewhat
more unpredictable than more tightly defined limits or exclusions would be.68
The fair use doctrine can be pivotal in maintaining the social utility balance of
copyright in the context of new technological uses for copyrighted works. When a new
technological use for copyrighted material is introduced, it can obscure the boundary
between authors’ exclusive rights and the rights and privileges reserved for the public.69
This blurring sometimes arises because the relationship of the new technological use to
the enumerated exclusive rights is unclear, e.g., whether posting content on a website on
the Internet is a transmission, a distribution, a publication, a public performance, or
something qualitatively different.70 Even where the new use would likely be an exercise of
an established exclusive right, however, the overarching social utilities that underlie
copyright protection may warrant a public privilege to participate in the new use, free of
permission constraints.71 In many copyright disputes arising from new technological uses,
the courts are called upon to clarify or delineate the contours of the copyright owner’s
property rights, or to otherwise balance the competing social utilities in the first instance,
before Congress has responded to the “brave new world.” In these situations, courts often
rely on the fair use doctrine to realign the respective rights and expectations of authors
and the public in connection with a particular new use for copyrighted material.72
68. See, e.g., New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that a

published critique on Scientology, which included some of the writings of Scientology’s creator, L. Ron
Hubbard, constituted fair use); Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th
Cir. 1996) (finding that the reproduction of “coursepacks” assembled from portions of copyrighted
works did not constitute fair use).

69. See Jamar, supra note 17, at 649–51; Wendy M. Pollack, Note, Tuning in: The Future of Copyright

Protection for Online Music in the Digital Millennium, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 2445, 2445 (2000).

70. See, e.g., Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 398–400 (1968) (holding

that re-transmission of captured signal was not a performance and therefore not a violation of copyrights);
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 408 (1974) (discussing whether
unauthorized cable transmission of copyrighted broadcasts violated the reproduction and distribution
rights); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) (loading software
onto RAM is a violation of copyright); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 717–18 (9th
Cir. 2007) (holding that thumbnail displays are direct infringement on copyright display right); Playboy
Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556–57 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (discussing whether unauthorized
computer screen displays violate display rights); Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 931–34
(N.D. Cal. 1996) (providing internet users with protected software was contributory infringement);
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15454, at *2–5 (E.D. Va. 1996) (holding that
unauthorized posting of copyrighted material on the internet for protest purposes was not fair use);
Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 830–31 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (distributing tape
on the internet would conflict with public distribution rights under Copyright Act); 1-800 Contacts,
Inc. v. Whenu.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 485–86 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that pop-up ads did not
infringe on website’s copyrights); Advance Mag. Publishers Inc. v. Leach, 466 F. Supp. 2d 628, 637 (D.
Md. 2006) (holding that unauthorized posting of copyrighted materials on a website is infringement);
Mtima, supra note 15, at 401–15 (discussing effect of Supreme Court decision on publishing contracts).

71.

See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing the public interest in
developing an effective search engine index for use in locating copyright images on the Internet); Mtima,
supra note 15.

72. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d at 820.
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For example, Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios involved a classic
copyright challenge to a new technology, but from an atypical posture. 73 In Sony, the
movie industry sought to bar all video‑cassette recorders (VCRs) from the marketplace
because VCRs could be used to make copies of copyrighted works (i.e., movies and
TV shows) directly from the television broadcasts. Thus Sony, through the manufacture
and marketing of its VCRs, was a contributory infringer. Sony and VCR users argued
that copying the broadcasts for later viewing (that is, “time shifting”) was fair use.
The posture of Sony was thus atypical both insofar as it was directed not at the person
doing the copying, the putative direct infringer, but rather at the person making that
erstwhile infringement possible, the putative contributory infringer.
In a typical fair use case, a finding that an authorized use qualifies as a fair use
applies only to the parties and activity specifically before the court. Subsequent users
can invoke the court’s prior decision as precedent, but given the fact-sensitive nature
of most fair use decisions, precedent can be of limited value. In Sony, however, instead
of being asked to assess a particular instance of unauthorized activity, the court was
effectively asked to generally categorize an activity (i.e., recording a program for later
viewing—time shifting) as either an author’s exclusive right to control or as a fair
use. In Sony, as in Acuff-Rose,74 the Court carved out a type of conduct as categorically
protected by fair use. The result of Sony is that members of the public who engage in
time shifting are shielded from infringement by the fair use doctrine.
In this respect, the decisions to protect time shifting (Sony) and parody (AcuffRose) are analogous to the availability of a legislative compulsory license, insofar as
they privilege an entire category of conduct that might otherwise infringe. The
underlying reasons for these doctrines are similarly strongly analogous insofar as the
type of use in question (not just the particular individual use) is evaluated from the
perspective of the importance of that type of use to the social utility objectives of
copyright as a whole. As discussed above, in many situations, Congress makes the
determination about the appropriate balance between the rights granted to the author
and the limits on those rights in order to both function as an incentive for the author
as well as to encourage widespread engagement with the works or types of works to
support cultural advancement. In cases such as Sony and Acuff-Rose, the courts
undertake a similar role.
C. The Role of Private Parties

Like Congress and the courts, private parties can be a positive force for promoting
social justice through copyright. Congress and the courts enact, develop, interpret,
and enforce copyright law. Private parties also construct and implement the law, both
normatively and experientially. Private agreements not only shape the copyright
reality, but their effectiveness can also chart the course for judicial and legislative
adaptation of the law to modern demands. An important past and ongoing example
73. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
74.

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (holding that the whole class of parodies
of copyrighted works is generally protected as fair use).
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of this shaping is the private creation of collective rights organizations (CROs) such
as the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Performers (ASCAP);
Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI); and the Harry Fox Agency (HFA) in the music world.
These CROs facilitate exploitation of musical compositions and sound recordings in
economically efficient ways that also serve the public purpose of copyright by
effectuating broad dissemination of works. Similarly, the proposed Settlement—
through its creation of mechanisms to widely disseminate digital copies of books
while providing remuneration to authors, often for works that are effectively
unavailable to most people since they are out of print—exemplifies private parties
(Google, authors, and publishers) working to include and empower others, i.e.,
working for social justice through the copyright regime.
Private parties have played, and continue to play, a vital role in the realization of
the constitutional aim of “promoting progress in Science and useful Arts.” This is an
important point that bears repeating because it is too often invisible or ignored:
Private parties drive copyright law and practice.75 Private parties shape copyright law
through a variety of means, specifically by:
1.	Creating new technologies that enable the creation of new types
of works, with photographs, movies, phonorecordings, radio
shows, television programs, and software being perhaps the most
prominent “new” types of works created after 1790;

2.	Creating new means of disseminating information and expressive
content, such as radio, television, records, reprography, MP3
files, and the Internet;
3.	Creating new works, especially by using new technologies, e.g.,
computer programs, video games, and social networking sites
like YouTube and Facebook;
4.	Disseminating works through various arrangements, essentially
creating private law under agency, contract, and property law
(which is how copyright holders get paid for their works);
5.	L obbying Congress and, indeed, collectively drafting major
portions of the Copyright Act and amendments to it; and
6.	Enforcing (and declining to enforce) rights (both the monopoly
right and the limitations and exceptions to it) through court
action, thereby inf luencing the development of the law (e.g.,
parodic works held as fair use by the Supreme Court).76
75. Cf. Edward Lee, Developing Copyright Practices for User-Generated Content, 1 J. Internet L. 1 (2009)

(problematically describing copyright holder practices of “forbearing suing” for known infringing uses
as “informal copyright”).

76. See Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 574–83.
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1. New Works from New Technologies

Private parties develop the law of copyright through invention of new technologies
that allow the creation of new works. While maps and other graphical works were
covered under the earliest versions of the U.S. Copyright Acts (maps, charts, and
books were covered in 179077 with engravings, etchings, and prints added in 1802),78
some other types of works known at the time were not protected, including musical
compositions (added in 1831),79 plays (added in 1856),80 and paintings, drawings, and
sculptures (added in 1870),81 though they had been around for millennia. The then
“newish” technology of photography was added in 186582 (five years before paintings
were included), forty years after the first permanent photographic image was made
on glass, and twenty-three years before modern film photography (Eastman Kodak’s
dry film and the camera to go with it) were first marketed.83
Private technological advances force copyright law to confront new questions of
rights allocation and the preservation of the copyright social utility balance. In 1790,
no one could have foreseen the coming of photography, phonorecording, movies,
radio, television, and software. The chemical understanding needed for photography
was in its infancy and the electricity needed for radio, television, and computers had
not yet been harnessed (the electric motor was invented in 1821).84 At that time, the
electromagnetic spectrum used for radio and television was unknown. Also, the
transistor85 and the semiconductor chip86 (both of which were necessary for modern
computers) were invented one and a half centuries later.
77.

Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 2 Stat. 124 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006 &
Supp. 2010)).

78. Copyright Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, §§ 2–3, 1 Stat. 171–72 (current version at § 101). Act of Apr.

29, 1806, ch. 36 , §§ 2, 3, 2 Stat. 171-172.

79. Copyright Act of Feb. 8, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 7, 2 Stat. 436, 438 (current version at § 101).
80. Copyright Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, §1, 1 Stat. 138–139 (current version at § 101).
81.

Copyright Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (current version at § 101).

82. Copyright Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, § 1, 13 Stat. 540 (current version at § 101).
83. See Analyzing the World’s First Photograph, National Public Radio (Apr. 7, 2002), http://www.npr.

org/programs/watc/features/2002/mar/photograph/; About Kodak, Kodak, http://www.kodak.com/
global/en/corp/historyOfKodak/buildingTheFoundation.jhtml?pq-path=2217/2687/2690 (last visited
Oct. 26, 2010).

84. Scientist Michael Faraday published his work on the principle behind the electric motor in 1821. Historic

Figures, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/faraday_michael.shtml (last visited Oct.
26, 2010).

85. See Dipak L. Sengupta & Tapan K. Sarkar, Early History of Electromagnetic Waves, 45 IEEE Antennas

and Propagation Mag., No. 2, Apr. 2003, at 17, available at http://www.physics.princeton.
edu/~mcdonald/examples/EM/sengupta_ieeeapm_45_2_13_03.pdf (The first electromagnetic waves
were transmitted and received in 1887); Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 Mich. L. Rev.
523, 537 (2010) (explaining that the transistor was invented in 1947).

86. The Semiconductor chip was invented in 1959. Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, The

Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984: A Swamp or Firm Ground? 70 Minn. L. Rev. 417, 431 (1985).
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In response to increasingly rapid technological advance (though it moved at what
seems a snail’s pace by today’s standards), the copyright law was reworked in 1909
with a shift from protecting a narrow, prescribed list of works to a more general
provision that purported to protect “all writings of an author.”87 Nonetheless, it still
listed types of works that could be copyrighted, retaining the list from the previous
law, thereby somewhat inhibiting its generality. Motion pictures were added to the
list in 191288 and sound recordings were not added until 1971.89
The Copyright Act of 1976 marked a major step away from a limited-list approach
to one that purported to protect all original authored works that were fixed in a tangible
medium of expression. Although a list of protectable works is still included, the
Copyright Act expressly states that the list is not intended to be exhaustive—that is,
that the things to which copyright protection applies are not limited to the items on
the list. Whatever the merits of the justifiable argument that the very presence of a list
continues to limit the scope of copyrightable subject matter, much as lists did in prior
versions of the Copyright Act, the list is undeniably very important in another way: the
rights an author has, the scope of protection for those rights, and the way the rights are
protected, in practice, still depend in large part upon which type of listed work it is.
Software, for example, is treated as a literary work along with poems, history books,
and employee manuals, and consequently, the scope of copyright for software is often
controlled by its status as an erstwhile literary work.90 This varied treatment creates
difficulties of application for certain newer types of works such as interactive video
games, which are part literary work (because of the software and story) and part
audiovisual work, with different rights and limits attached to each part.
In the Digital Information Age, digital formats for music, pictures, and movies
allow the creation of new works through the use of existing works as raw material.
This creation of digital collages through remixing is the result of the re-envisioning
of traditional works as source material and the proliferation of technologies that
allow relatively easy, quick, and affordable remixes to be made.91 Society’s interest in
encouraging these new forms of creative expression while preserving the authorincentive interests in traditional works compels new judicial and legislative approaches

87.

Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 4, 35 Stat. 1075.

88. Copyright Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-303, § 5, 37 Stat. 488.
89. Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 5, 85 Stat. 391.
90. See, e.g., Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff ’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 776–77 (9th Cir. 2006); Lexmark

Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 533 (6th Cir. 2004); General Universal
Sys. Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131, 142–43 (5th Cir. 2004); Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 235–39 (2d Cir.
1998); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus. Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 838–43 (10th Cir. 1993).

91.

Remixing, especially in audio recordings, can use analog as well as digital media, but the existence of
digital formats makes remixing or making collages easier. See Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s
Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 63, 103–29 (2002–03). Photoshop allows digital modification of
photographs in ways not really possible in the age of the Monty Python Flying Circus moving collages of
forty years ago.
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toward maintaining the copyright infrastructure.92 This sort of ability to create new
works from aspects of existing works is an important aspect of social justice
empowerment through intellectual property law.
		

2. New Means of Disseminating Works

Copyright law is also shaped by the creation, development, and exploitation of
new means of disseminating copyrightable works. Once-new means for disseminating
works that have changed copyright law include radio, television, movies, records,
reprography, MP3 files, and, perhaps most prominently and problematically, the
Internet, with its protean manifestations. Whether a broadcast on radio or television
constituted a publication or public performance was not always clear.93 When copyright
moved from publication to fixation as the critical event, special rules had to be made
for live broadcasts.94 The rules for Internet posts, which implicate the exclusive rights
of reproduction, distribution, and public display, are still being developed.
At one time, the owner, the existence, and the scope of the copyright for a work
may have been relatively easy to determine. But with the large number of people
potentially involved in all creative aspects of making a movie or sound recording, the
problem of who owns (and thus who profits from) the copyright can be more
problematic.95 If copyright only protects the screenplay or the composition, then
there is no copyright for the movie or sound recording, respectively. But if the film or
sound recording is protected, who should be included as an owner of the work and
thus entitled to property rights under the copyright law?
The move to digital formats, with the ability to make perfect copies and distribute
them cheaply and easily through compact disks, DVDs, flash drives, and the Internet,
creates a host of new problems for copyright law. Congress and the courts have
addressed these challenges to some degree, but the rules are also being developed by
private individuals through standardized contracts and licensing schemes, which
shape copyright owners’ and users’ expectations and options for exploitation.
92.

See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003); Digital Millennium Copyright Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in various sections of Title 17 of the U.S.
Code). See generally Menell, supra note 91, at 133–38.

93.

See, e.g., Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 408 (1974); Fortnightly Corp.
v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 398–400 (1968).

94. Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 102, a creative work must be fixed, i.e., written down, recorded, or filmed in

order to be eligible for copyright protection. As the act of fixation became easier for the public to engage
in (for example the advent of hand held video cameras) Congress passed the Anti-Bootlegging Act, to
provide performing artists with the exclusive right to fix (i.e., record) their live performances. See 17
U.S.C. § 1101; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2319A.

95. The work made for hire doctrine provides a solution, but under that doctrine the creative input of all

collaborators in the project seems to skew the rights away from the artists. “A work made for hire is (1)
a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially
ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work . . . if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the
work shall be considered a work made for hire.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006 & Supp. 2010).

97

Fulfilling the Copyright Social Justice Promise: Digitizing Textual Information

		

3. Creating New Kinds of Works Using New Technologies

		

4. Private Transactions

Private parties also shape copyright law by creating works, especially when using
new technologies. Creating digital works such as computer programs and video
games challenge and shape copyright law by pressing it into service in areas it has not
previously been called upon to address. Using new technologies to create even wellestablished types of works—including musical compositions and sound recordings
through sampling music, digital photography, and programs such as Photoshop, and
more recently digital film—also presents new challenges. In addition, the copyright
issues surrounding social networking sites have yet to be worked out. Creating digital
copies of books and making them available online create similar challenges.
Without dissemination of works, the constitutional objective of advancing
knowledge and art is unmet. One of the problems of distribution, however, is how to
generate sufficient remuneration for the authors of works in order to induce the
creation of new works while still ensuring wide dissemination and use.
The remuneration problem is particularly acute for works and uses of works that
are low in value on a per-unit basis. The distribution and the performance of music
and sound recordings are examples of such low-value-per-unit works (especially the
performance of the music).96 The creation of works for which each transaction yields
only a small reward will be stymied by high transaction costs, unless an efficient
system of broad distribution is developed.
The primary solution to the remuneration problem has been the creation of
private law through various licensing and transfer arrangements under agency,
contract, and property law. The development of the collective rights organizationbased transaction system for the commercial distribution of music is a good example
of the problem and a solution to it. The core of the solution came from, and is still
based upon, private actors. But both Congress and the courts ultimately acted to
improve and legitimize the private solution through amendments to and interpretation
and application of the Copyright Act and antitrust law.97
Prior to 1909, copyright in music extended only to musical compositions; even for
compositions there was no general public performance right until 1897, when
Congress statutorily granted this right to the copyright holder. Thus, prior to that
time, and until the 1909 Copyright Act, the copyright law essentially protected only
the sale of sheet music; thus, making a sound recording of a composition did not
96. For example, a single song can be downloaded from iTunes for 99¢. Music, iTunes, http://www.apple.

com/itunes/whats-on/#music (last visited Oct. 25, 2010). CDs are sold for around $10.00 to $15.00.
Music to Our Ears from EMI, Pogue’s Posts (April 3, 2007, 9:55 AM), http://pogue.blogs.nytimes.
com/2007/04/03/music-to-our-ears-from-emi/?scp=9&sq=iTunes%20album%20cost&st=cse. The
costs of writing and producing a song are much greater than the costs of a single copy.

97.

See, e.g., Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 594–95 (1917) (holding that performance of copyrighted
material in a hotel for the pleasure of its guests did infringe on the public performance right and
ultimately the rightsholder’s monopoly as intended under the Constitution).
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infringe as a copy or as a public performance of the work.98 In the 1909 Copyright
Act, Congress expanded the copyright in musical compositions to include “mechanical
reproductions” (i.e., recordings) of the works, and concomitantly provided a
compulsory license, such that once a composer had licensed the recording of the
work by one recording company, any other company had the right to record and
distribute the recording of the work upon paying the statutory license fee. Section
115 of the Copyright Act still contains the compulsory license fee, which covers not
only physical recordings but also digital formats and formats that can be transferred
online (e.g., MP3 files).99
Although the enactment of the compulsory license balanced the social good with
the private interest by ensuring public access to recorded musical performances, it did
not by itself solve the transactional cost problem; that was left to private parties to
resolve. The solution was the creation of a number of CROs to administer licensing
of the works, including getting licenses from the copyright holders; licensing certain
uses to users; collecting license fees; and distributing the proceeds to the copyright
holders. For example, ASCAP was formed in 1914 by nine music businesses.100 On
behalf of composers, lyricists, and record companies, ASCAP sued restaurants and
nightclubs that performed music on the grounds that they were public performances.
In 1917, the Supreme Court agreed with ASCAP.101
The CROs thereafter administered both recording rights (e.g., the Harry Fox
Agency) and public performance rights (e.g., ASCAP and BMI). Eventually the
CROs became so successful that in 1941 they were sued by the United States under
antitrust law, on the grounds that just a few CROs controlled the licensing of all
musical compositions and works. Ultimately, the cases were settled under consent
decrees which are still in place and are reviewed from time to time.102
Today numerous statutory provisions limit the rights of music copyright holders
while the consent decrees contain provisions that help ensure that the CROs meet
the constitutional purpose of serving the public interest. As noted by Professor Julie
Cohen:
[B]oth societies operate under antitrust consent decrees that govern their
membership, internal governance, and licensing practices. The decrees require
ASCAP and BMI to make membership available on a nondiscriminatory

98. White-Smith Music Publ’g. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908); see also infra note 102.
99. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006 & Supp. 2010). The intricacies and exceptions with respect to digital transmissions

of musical works and sound recordings are beyond the scope of this article.

100. ASCAP History, ASCAP, www.ascap.com/about/history/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
101. Shanley, 242 U.S. at 594–95.
102. United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 275 F.3d 168, 171–72 (2d Cir. 2001) (“In 1941, the United States

brought separate antitrust suits against BMI and its main competitor, the American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers . . . for unlawfully monopolizing the licensing of performing rights.
Both suits were settled by consent decree. In 1950, the ASCAP consent decree was amended to establish
a ‘rate court’ mechanism, which enabled the court to set fees for licenses when license applicants and
ASCAP could not come to agreement. The government brought the instant suit against BMI in 1964,
and the parties entered into a consent decree two years later.” (citations omitted)).
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basis, to issue licenses to all who request them, and to accept a judiciallydetermined reasonable fee (ASCAP) or a fee determined by an arbitrator
(BMI) in the event of a dispute. Most significantly, the decrees prohibit
ASCAP and BMI from holding or licensing any rights in copyrighted musical
compositions other than the public performance rights. These provisions
suggest that the government and the respective courts believed that allowing
collective organizations control over the entire bundle of rights in copyrighted
works would be detrimental to competition.103

Thus, the core of the solution for reducing transaction costs of low-value-perunit musical works and facilitating broad dissemination to the public came not from
Congress or the courts, but from private parties. In concert with particular statutory
provisions (some of which were themselves the product of negotiations among private
parties), this privately created mechanism continues to promote the widespread
distribution of copyrighted music to the general public.104
		

5. Private Parties’ Impact on Copyright Legislation

		

6. Selective Enforcement of Rights

Private parties have also affected copyright law by lobbying Congress, and even
by drafting provisions of and amendments to the Copyright Act. The Copyright Act
itself is not purely the product of members of Congress or congressional staff. Rather,
many of the rights, limitations, and exceptions to copyright protections—especially
for “new” problems like satellite transmissions and cable systems—are the product of
private multi-party negotiations.105 Essentially, these amendments represent the
results of identified interest groups sitting down and hammering out compromises.106
But not everyone has been invited to the table. The omission of certain groups creates
a concern for copyright social justice interests because the failure to include all interest
groups in these discussions heightens the risk that socio-economic empowerment
interests will not be fully considered or addressed in the legislation.
Private parties also shape copyright reality by enforcing or declining to enforce
rights (both the monopoly right and the limitations and exceptions to it) through
court action. For example, in 2009 when the National Football League attempted to
enforce its video broadcast rights in the Super Bowl against churches, the public
103. Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management,” 97 Mich.

L. Rev. 462, 500–01 (1998).

104. Yet another area of private parties inf luencing copyright by transactions arises in the employment

setting. Universities typically do not treat scholarly and creative pieces such as articles, books, and
artistic works as works made for hire, though faculty job descriptions require the creation of such pieces.
On the other hand, employee and independent contractor contracts of commercial businesses often, and
probably typically, treat employee work-products as works made for hire in accordance with the statute
or require assignment of the rights in the pieces to the employer.

105. See Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 Or. L. Rev. 19, 23 (1996).
106. Id.
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outcry resulted in it choosing not to enforce its rights, thereby in essence granting a
blanket license to churches to show the Super Bowl.107 J. K. Rowling does not enforce
all of her rights in her Harry Potter works; she allows fan fiction to flourish online
and allows the creation of certain online Harry Potter resources.108 On the other
hand, when one person attempted to publish a “Harry Potter Encyclopedia,” and
commercially exploit Rowling’s derivative work rights in hard copy, she sued.109
Copyright social utility and social justice, in both their procedural forms (a seat
at the table when copyright rights and limits are determined) and their substantive
forms (access to copyrighted works and inclusion and empowerment through the
creation and exploitation of works), are thus furthered by Congress, the courts, and
private parties.110 These obligations remain paramount in the Digital Information
Age and, arguably, the responsibility to satisfy them is heighted by the availability of
new methods through which to achieve them. Thus, innovative applications of digital
information technology in the cause of addressing these goals, whatever their genesis,
should be encouraged by the courts and by Congress as the primary caretakers of the
copyright regime.
IV.	THE GOOGLE BOOKS PROJECT: A PRIVATE SECTOR COPYRIGHT DEVELOPMENT
INITIATIVE FOR THE DIGITAL INFORMATION AGE

Notwithstanding the revolutionary advances in digital information technology
(not to mention the constitutional mandates of copyright law), limited physical access
remains a barrier to the use of many books for millions of Americans and for most
people throughout the world. Many books are directly available only to those who
are privileged enough to attend or to be employed by a major research institution,
where copies of particular volumes are physically housed. Generally, the vast majority
of individuals must rely on public libraries, which provide limited access because of
107. Charlie Butts, Super Bowl Parties Legal, Says NFL, OneNewsNow, Jan. 22, 2009, http://www.

onenewsnow.com/Culture/Default.aspx?id=392860; Jacqueline L. Salmon, NFL Pulls Plug on Big-Screen
Church Parties for Super Bowl, Wash. Post, Feb. 1, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2008/01/31/AR2008013103958.html; Bob Unruh, Church ‘Super Bowl’ Festivities May
Go On, WorldNetDaily, Feb. 2, 2007, http://www.wnd.com/index.php?fa=PAGE.view&pageId=40004.

108. See, e.g., Harry Potter Wiki, http://harrypotter.wikia.com/wiki/Main_Page (last visited, Oct. 27,

2010).

109. Plaintiff ’s First Amended Complaint ¶ 1, Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. RDR Books, No. 07-CV-9667-

RPP (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2008); Anemona Hartocollis, Sued by Harry Potter’s Creator, Lexicographer Breaks
Down on the Stand, N.Y. Times, April 16, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/16/nyregion/16
potter.html?_r=2.

110. The executive branch also plays an important role through its enforcement policies, especially through

antitrust actions and internationally through trade agreements and enforcement at the border. The
authors have submitted formal comments through Institute for Intellectual Property & Social Justice
(IIPSJ) to the Obama administration on the social justice implications of intellectual property
enforcement. Lateef Mtima & Steven D. Jamar, Comment, IIPSJ Comments on IP Enforcement by the
Federal Government, Inst. of Intell. Prop. & Soc. Justice, Inc. (Mar. 24, 2010), in response to
Coordination and Strategic Planning of the Federal Effort Against Intellectual Property Infringement:
Request of the Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator for Public Comments Regarding the
Joint Strategic Plan, 75 Fed. Reg. 8137 (Feb. 23, 2010).
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the limited number of books they contain due to their space and funding limitations.
Moreover, the problem of limited physical access is compounded by legal and practical
difficulties stemming from the copyright law—including, in particular, the challenges
of licensing works that are out of print but still in copyright, and “orphan works” for
which comprehensive ownership rights are difficult or expensive to ascertain. Even
in those instances where the author and publisher of a work can be found, the
transaction costs of finding them and licensing the work may exceed the expected
current and future commercial market value of the work.111
When the commercial market has abandoned certain books, the segment of the
public still interested in these works is underserved by the limited or non-existent
access to them. While the number of people interested in many out-of-print books
can sometimes be relatively small, the central purpose of copyright law—the
advancement of knowledge and culture—is frustrated to the extent that these people
are underserved. Furthermore, many of the authors of such works very much want
their works to be widely accessible once again. Authors write books to have their
voices heard, not stif led by physical and legal impediments. In the absence of
distribution methods that solve the problems of both physical and legal access, the
creative and expressive goals of many authors are stymied.
The Google Books Project is an example of private parties employing digital
information technology to address these issues and the Settlement is an example of
private parties working through the courts to develop a system that will allow both
broad dissemination of digital forms of works and compensation of the copyright
holders. While the initial idea was to prepare digital copies solely for use by the
libraries and, through a search engine indexing system, to provide only “snippets” of
the texts to the general public,112 the Project has since evolved into a more ambitious
endeavor. In response to litigation claims by various copyright holders that the Project
infringed upon certain of their exclusive rights, Google entered into negotiations
with the rightsholders and it soon became apparent that, by working together, the
parties could construct one of the most important applications of digital information
technology in the information age.113 With the permission of the rightsholders (and
in exchange for certain licensing fees), Google would not only digitize the texts but
would make its entire digital library, including complete copies of the digitized texts,
111. Specifically, once the public loses interest in a book, commercial publishers cease to print new copies

because it is not profitable to run copies of a book that almost no one is going to purchase.

112. The purpose in providing the public with text snippets was to enable users to identify books that might

contain content of interest to them, similar to the subject categorizations and summaries typically found
in library catalogues and indices. See Library Project—An Enhanced Card Catalog of the World’s Books,
Google Books, http://books.google.com/googlebooks/common.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
Google contended that the preparation of digital copies for private use, as well as the preparation and
dissemination of text snippets constituted a fair use of copyrighted works. See Perspectives: Facts &
Fiction, Google Books, http://books.google.com/googlebooks/facts.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
Various rightsholders disagreed, however, and filed copyright infringement litigation. See Complaint,
Authors Guild, Inc., v. Google, Inc.,No. 05-CV-8136-JES (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 20, 2005).

113. See Google Books Settlement Agreement, supra note 1.
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available to the general public.114 In short, rightsholders and users would collaborate
in the creation of the most comprehensive—and most widely accessible—library in
the history of the world.
The Google Books Project can achieve unprecedented levels of copyright social
utility and social justice. Upon implementing the Project, Google will make vast
numbers of public domain, out-of-print, and hard to find books available online to
essentially everyone with Internet access. Google Books thus exemplifies private
party action that furthers the inclusion and empowerment aspects of the copyright
law by including people who would otherwise not have access to the national
storehouse of books.
The Settlement similarly exemplifies a social justice-conscious approach to
copyright social utility. It is a private party mechanism that, under court supervision,
provides for payments to copyright holders in ways that will reduce transaction costs
while still ensuring that the overarching purpose of copyright law—furthering the
public good through the progress of science and the arts—is met. At the Settlement’s
core are the private parties who determine the terms of the deal. But due to the
nature, scope, and social significance of the deal, it is appropriate that a court
supervise its implementation, as courts have done and are doing in the context of
CRO lawsuits involving copyrighted musical works.115
Virtually all copyright scholars, commentators, and activists agree that massdigitization of the world’s books is the answer to many copyright social utility
dilemmas.116 Collecting and compiling the world’s store of printed knowledge into
exhaustive digital libraries available to everyone who can access the Internet is an
undeniable step toward unparalleled scholarly cross-fertilization and artistic and
utilitarian exchange, not to mention a step toward leveling the world’s educational
and informational playing fields. Indeed, even those who have raised concerns about,
and objections to, the Settlement and other current proposals for mass-digitization
of text concede that they take umbrage only with respect to particular details relating
to the implementation of certain proposals, and not to the prospect of the massdigitization of text itself.117
The principal objection to the Settlement is the potential impact on the traditional
copyright licensing paradigm. Specifically, the objection is that, as an “opt-out”
system, the Settlement turns copyright on its head by permitting intrusion upon the
copyright holder’s property rights without her explicit permission, and places the
burden on the copyright holder to withdraw her work from the pool of mass-digitized

114. Id.
115. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., Travis, supra note 27.
117. See, e.g., Letter from Pamela Samuelson, Professor of Law & Info., Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Law, to The

Hon. Denny Chin, S.D.N.Y., (Sept. 3, 2009), available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/letters/
samuelson.pdf (agreeing that the creation of a “universal digital library” is an inspiring goal, but that the
terms of the Amended Settlement Agreement are not likely to achieve that goal).
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works.118 However, this objection distorts the constitutional copyright balance
between the author-incentive mechanism and the public interest. While American
copyright is to some extent an author-permission regime, author property interests
are neither inviolable nor even paramount.119 Unlike European law, American
copyright law is not based upon natural rights but rather it is positive law premised
on principles of social utility. And, in actuality, American copyright law favors
neither the author nor the individual user of aesthetic works, but rather holds
paramount the interest of society in developing a thriving, vibrant culture.120 As
discussed above, both Congress and the courts have repeatedly sanctioned public
intrusion upon the author’s exclusive right in furtherance of the goal of overarching
copyright social utility,121 and that option remains available in the digital information
context.
Indeed, the problem of the mass-digitization of so-called “orphan works,”
presents a nigh-perfect opportunity for the application of paradigmatic copyright
social utility. In the absence of the Settlement, the public would be denied access to
millions of works, not because the copyright holders have objected to their digital
distribution, but based upon the irrational presumption that the authors of these
works would prefer that their ideas not be disseminated nor any remuneration be
paid to them until it can be positively confirmed that this is their preference. Even if
this could somehow be construed as a rational presumption of copyright behavior, to
allow such socially pernicious obduracy to take precedence would be the choice that
turns American copyright law on its head.
Concededly, a better argument against implementation of the Settlement is that,
while affirmative action must be taken to reconcile author autonomy with the
opportunities of the Digital Information Age, the initial groundwork for such an
undertaking might best be left to governmental and/or scholarly institutions in the
public sector, which would (at least in theory) implement a broad and inclusive
construction process. Albeit a rational argument, it fails to account for the historical
realities of copyright’s adaptation to new technological challenges.

118. Under the terms of the Settlement, Google is permitted to proceed with the digitization of the works of

American authors unless or until a copyright holder objects to the inclusion of her particular work in the
Project. Amended Settlement Agreement §1.134, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No.
05-CV-5136-DC (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2009), available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/amended_
settlement/Amended-Settlement-Agreement.pdf. Critics argue that this approach is contrary to the
traditional expectation of rightsholders, specifically, that their works cannot be used by others until they
grant express permission; consequently, these critics maintain that the Project should only be permitted
to proceed as an “opt-in” system, such that no book can be included until the rightsholder grants her
express permission.

119. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
120. See id.
121. See supra Part III.
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As discussed above, the courts have effectively addressed this kind of “new
technological use problem” in the past, in cases such as White-Smith,122 Fortnightly,123
Teleprompter,124 Sony,125 and, specifically in the digital information context, Arriba
Soft Corp.126 Indeed, it has often been the judicial interpretation and application of
the law in this context that has provided a guide for eventual legislative action, after
sufficient time has passed to observe the effects of judicial intervention and
disposition.
Moreover, there is no reason to presume that private party initiatives are inherently
inimical to the public good. As repeatedly demonstrated throughout the history of
copyright law, new technological developments and the attendant controversies that
spark new interpretations of, and often improvements to, copyright law in order to
secure and promote its overarching goals, are the legitimate province of all copyright
stakeholders, i.e., they all have roles to play in responding to such challenges. While
Congress and the courts are bound by the constitutionally articulated responsibility
to promote the public benefit purposes of copyright law, private copyright owners
and users also have a significant role to play in this endeavor, as indeed they have
played throughout the development of copyright law. A mechanism that provides a
socially propitious resolution to new technological use-challenges should be assessed
on its merits, irrespective of its origins.
Finally, there is simply no guarantee that a public sector initiative will in fact
produce superior results from the perspective of social utility or social justice. Quite
to the contrary, the lack of action or even consensus among public sector actors (e.g.,
Congress and lobbyists), and their pervasive failure to recognize the Digital Divide
dilemma as a problem of copyright social utility, has reinforced the obstacles to
meaningful progress in this area for almost a quarter of a century. Now that a
meaningful mechanism for bridging the Digital Divide at least with respect to
textual material and related copyright deficiencies has arisen from the private sector,
it would be not only counterproductive but simply unfair to halt this progress after
the digitally disenfranchised have been overlooked for so very long.
The Google Books Project and the Settlement constitute a private initiative that
is poised to fill the vacuum of institutional inaction in response to specific copyright
social utility deficiencies and injustices of the Digital Information Age. By combining
the digitization of text with widespread access to it, Google Books could be a boon
to those who heretofore have had little or no access to such materials. In short,
122. White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (treating the then-new technology of

making, selling, and playing piano rolls of musical compositions as not infringing on the sheet music
copyrights).

123. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968) (finding that antennas used to

transfer television signals do not infringe on programming copyrights).

124. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 408 (1974).
125. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (holding Sony’s manufacturing

and selling of VCRs used to record broadcast television programs for later viewing not contributory
infringement because time shifting by users is fair use and thus not direct infringement).

126. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Google Books could be the technological bridge traversing the Digital Divide: books
would be available not only to those who enjoy the privilege of access to elite libraries,
e.g., Harvard University’s library, but to anyone with access to a computer and the
Internet. Many people would have access through public libraries in their communities,
while others would gain access through schools as well as through outreach by various
organizations that seek to aid particular historically and currently marginalized
groups.127 Furthermore, the blind and visually impaired would have dramatically
expanded access to books through technologies that can vocalize digital text and
expand the font size to more easily readable sizes. And as automated translation
improves and develops, even more material will become available in languages other
than that in which the work was originally expressed.
In addition to the obvious copyright social justice benefits, Google Books could
also further the more general goals of copyright social utility. Google Books could
help to serve the public interest simply by making it easier for everyone to acquire
books that are still under copyright but that are out of print or otherwise unavailable.128
Digitizing out-of-print books gives them a second life. The Settlement also proposes
to eliminate the problems surrounding access to orphan works by providing
mechanisms to make these works available and eschewing the legal limbo typically
encountered by many who seek to use these works.129
And, of course, Google Books will make available many books which are in the
public domain but that are physically inaccessible to nearly everyone. At the same
time, it will provide a method for distributing books that are in copyright and still in
print to those who want to take advantage of digital distribution (as opposed to
traditional, “brick and mortar” booksellers or Internet channels for locating and
purchasing hard copy versions of texts).
Finally, just as Google Books serves the copyright social utility and social justice
interests of the using public, it must also respect copyright’s author-incentive
mechanisms, which ensure a growing store of creative expression. To this end, the
Settlement proposes meaningful mechanisms for compensating copyright holders and
other stakeholders.130 By also addressing these interests, Google Books exemplifies the
optimum copyright balance, achieving a copyright equipoise appropriate to the Digital
Information Age.
V. CONCLUSION

While it would be disingenuous to attempt to characterize any mass-digitization
effort as flawless, it cannot be gainsaid that this copyright initiative must begin
127. Google Books Library Project, supra note 1.
128. Id.; Miguel Helft, It’s Not Just Microsoft Balking at Google’s Book Plans, N.Y. Times Bits Blog (Apr. 4,

2009, 4:18 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/04/its-not-just-microsoft-thats-balking-atgoogles-book-plans/.

129. Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 118, §§ 3.8, 7.2(b)(v).
130. See id. art. IV.
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somewhere.131 The Google Books Project and the Settlement embody a way to
address the copyright social justice interests of the public while preserving, and even
enhancing, the proprietary interests of copyright holders in digitized text. Rather
than permitting the marvel of digital information technology to serve as the source
of a Digital Divide in American society and throughout the globe, Google Books
provides the most important opportunity to date through which to close the existing
gap and enable this technology to fulfill its ultimate copyright potential. To forego or
even delay this achievement would be an affront to the most cherished goals that
underlie copyright law as an engine for learning and the advancement of culture in
American society.
Early in the proliferation of digital information technology, copyright scholars
such as Julie Cohen, Jessica Litman, and Pamela Samuelson identified the
opportunities proffered by the new technologies to restore the primacy of the public
interest and importance of the public domain in the structure, implementation, and
understanding of modern copyright law.132 Others, such as Lawrence Lessig and
William Patry have addressed the necessity of weighing the constitutional values of
progress and social utility in developing the copyright law and, in particular, in
creating and promoting mechanisms that help private parties serve those values while
pursuing their own interests.133 Their contributions include promoting user-generated
content and the creation of creative commons licenses, among others.134 To these
positive, important developments in the understanding of, and use of, copyright law,
and indeed intellectual property protection as a whole, we seek to add another
dimension: the achievement of copyright social justice, especially in its inclusion and
empowerment manifestations, as a vital part of the constitutional values and other
social utilitarian mandates underpinning our copyright law.
The exclusion or inequitable exploitation of certain groups from the full
intellectual property franchise is more than an ecumenical malaise of the social
welfare; it is an intellectual property deficiency of constitutional dimensions.
Copyright and other intellectual property regimes are not inherently antithetical to
131. Transcript of Record at 8–9, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05-CV-8136-DC (S.D.N.Y. Feb.

18, 2010) (Testimony of Lateef Mtima, on behalf of the Institute of Intellectual Property and Social
Justice), available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/case_order/fairness-hearing-transcript.pdf.

Id.

Now we recognize that the proposed settlement will not cure all of the deficiencies of
the digital divide, but to those who say that this will provide only trivial improvement,
we humbly suggest that they may be unfamiliar with what the disenfranchised can do
with only a little. Give a slave pig intestines and she will make chitlins. Seek to provide
Frederick Douglass with a few books and he will provide our nation with insight into its
very character. And literally, toss peanuts to George Washington Carver and he will
produce scientific marvels from which we can benefit for generations.

132. See Cohen, supra note 103; Litman, supra note 4; Samuelson supra note 63.
133. See Lessig, supra note 4; Patry, supra note 4.
134. Creative commons licenses permit others to use and build upon preexisting copyrighted works

automatically, without the need to seek specific permission. About, Creative Commons, http://
creativecommons.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2010).
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social justice interests. Quite the contrary. We contend that intellectual property
regimes can and should be crafted and administered so that marginalized and
disadvantaged groups, “the others,” can participate more fully in the social, cultural,
and economic contributions and benefits that f low from intellectual property
protection. That is the core objective of intellectual property law, and the intended
benefit to the societal good. Initiatives such as Google Books Project that further
these objectives and promote such benefits in the Digital Information Age must be
encouraged, embraced, and built upon to the benefit of society as a whole.
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